Iran IRGC
The last year saw many controversial steps taken by the administration of US President Donald Trump, but the harsh policy on Iran, including the introduction of new sanctions against Tehran over its ballistic missile program and refusal to certify Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), are among the most notable issues worth reflecting upon.
Trump’s policy on Iran created uncertainty and anxiety among the international community, which fears that the US president may follow through on his threats to scrap the deal signed in July 2015 by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 group of nations comprising the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom plus Germany after 20 months of difficult negotiations.
New Rounds of Sanctions
The agreement stipulating the gradual cancellation of the sanctions in exchange for Tehran abandoning its nuclear program did not stop the US administration from toughening the restrictions it imposed on Iran as in August Trump enacted new sanctions against the country over its missile program. According to the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, any individuals who are engaged in or support in any way the Iranian government’s ballistic missile program and other programs related to weapons of mass destruction that “directly threaten the United States and key allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond,” should have their property seized, visas denied, or even be expelled by Washington.
The law also imposed restrictions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an elite faction of Iran’s military which is said to be executing Tehran’s “policy of supporting terrorist and insurgent groups” and “destabilizing activities.” The sanctions included property seizures, suspension of entry into the United States and prohibition of transactions with individuals engaged in IRGC activities.
The move was widely criticized by senior Iranian officials, who claimed that the US law had violated the provisions of the JCPOA which were signed in July 2015 by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 group of nations comprising the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom plus Germany. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had even warned that Tehran might pull out from the nuclear deal “within days or hours” if the United States continued its hostile policy, accusing Washington of being “neither a good partner nor a reliable negotiating party.” US officials have argued that sanctions were not related to the country’s nuclear program and therefore did not violate the deal.
Trump made the US relations with Iran even tenser by announcing on October 13 more sanctions against entities related to the ballistic missile program and the IRGC. Trump’s move prompted an immediate response from Tehran, with its Foreign Ministry warning that it would have “a consistent and harsh reaction” to the measures against the IRGC. Furthermore, the Iranian military vowed to speed up the development of the country’s missile program.
The next month the US Treasury Department expanded the sanctions against Tehran even further, imposing restrictions on the IRGS-related Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, Air Force, Al-Ghadir Missile Command, and Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization.
Even during his election campaign, Trump labeled the JCPOA as “the worst deal ever negotiated.” Since assuming the office in January, he had repeatedly slammed Iran for alleged non-compliance with the deal and threatened to pull out from the agreement which was actively promoted by his predecessor Barack Obama and led to the removal of all nuclear-related US sanctions against Tehran.
The Western diplomats and leaders exerted efforts to convince the Trump administration of the JCPOA’s merits on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. For example, the issue has been discussed at the bilateral meetings between Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Theresa May, however, they did not manage to make him change his stance. Trump told May that he had already made his mind on what he would do next month, when he was due to announce whether to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.
On September 19, Trump addressed the UN General Assembly on various international issues, including the nuclear deal with Iran and Tehran’s policy in the Middle East. The US president accused the Iranian authorities of funding terrorism, backing Syrian President Bashar Assad’s “dictatorship” and fueling the war in Yemen. Trump also stated that the nuclear deal served as a disguise for Iran’s nuclear program and called the deal itself an “embarrassment” to the United States.
Next day, the foreign ministers of all signatory states convened the meeting of the Joint Commission on the deal’s implementation. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained to his counterparts that the Obama administration implemented the deal through the executive order without congressional ratification, and therefore the United States was seeking to renegotiate the terms of the agreement so that it satisfied the incumbent president and the US citizens. He also confirmed that Trump had decided on whether to walk away from the deal, which prompted concerns about the US potential withdrawal.
On October 13, apart from announcing fresh sanctions, Trump stated that his administration had decided not to re-certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. He added that the White House would work with Congress and its allies abroad to fix “many serious flaws” of the agreement, in particular replacing temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program with permanent ones, and threatened to otherwise unilaterally terminate the deal. The US president citied Iran’s alleged non-compliance with the deal, referring to the fact that Iran had exceeded agreed-upon limits on its heavy water stocks several times.
If Washington pulls out of the agreement, it’s likely to not only re-impose its own nuclear-related sanctions on Iran’s economy, but might also demand the reinstatement of the UNSC’s sanctions, which were promoted by former US presidents George Bush and Barack Obama, and later lifted after the JCPOA was signed.
The United States sees sanctions and strengthening restrictions under the nuclear deal as coercive means to curb Iran’s aggressive policy in the Middle East, which contradict the US security interests. This includes Iran’s funding of the Shiite militia in crisis-torn Lebanon and Yemen, primarily through its ally, the Hezbollah movement, as well as support for the Assad government in Syria and engagement in the diplomatic row between Qatar and Arab states.
Furthermore, Washington is using economic and political pressure to roll back Iran’s non-nuclear military development, first and foremost, the country’s ballistic missile program which poses a direct threat to Iran’s adversaries and the US allies in the region, namely Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council, in particular Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) think tank, noted that despite division within the Congress on the nuclear deal, the US officials were sharing concerns with Tehran’s persistent attempts to arm Hezbollah in order to increase its military role in the region.
“Whatever the debate over the JCPOA, there may well be a broader consensus in the administration that Iran’s growing military role in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere in the region must be countered,” Abrams wrote in his blog post for CFR.
The harsh stance on Iran, though broadly criticized by other parties to the JCPOA, was welcomed by the United States’ major allies in the region, which have long been countering Iran’s attempt to gain stronger influence in the region. This, in turn, forged an unlikely alliance between the Israelis and the Saudis, who hold opposing positions on the Palestinian issue.
In November, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Gadi Eisenkot said in an interview with the Saudi Elaph newspaper that Israel was willing to share intelligence with Saudi Arabia regarding Iran’s activities in the region, with Iranian media even alleging that Israel is directly lobbying the US Congress to abandon the deal with Iran.
At the same time, the Trump administration may pursue certain goals in its domestic policy through exerting additional pressure on Iran.
Gianluca Pastori, an adjunct professor at Italy’s Catholic University of the Sacred Heart Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, told Sputnik that the sanctions policy aimed at proving to Congress that the Trump administration’s international stance was tougher than the approach of the previous administration.
“[Such moves] have a strong domestic dimension, appeasing the largely anti-Iranian Congress and remarking the difference existing between the current and the previous administration,” the expert said.
Trump’s policy on Iran created uncertainty and anxiety among the international community, which fears that the US president may follow through on his threats to scrap the deal signed in July 2015 by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 group of nations comprising the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom plus Germany after 20 months of difficult negotiations.
New Rounds of Sanctions
The agreement stipulating the gradual cancellation of the sanctions in exchange for Tehran abandoning its nuclear program did not stop the US administration from toughening the restrictions it imposed on Iran as in August Trump enacted new sanctions against the country over its missile program. According to the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, any individuals who are engaged in or support in any way the Iranian government’s ballistic missile program and other programs related to weapons of mass destruction that “directly threaten the United States and key allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond,” should have their property seized, visas denied, or even be expelled by Washington.
The law also imposed restrictions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an elite faction of Iran’s military which is said to be executing Tehran’s “policy of supporting terrorist and insurgent groups” and “destabilizing activities.” The sanctions included property seizures, suspension of entry into the United States and prohibition of transactions with individuals engaged in IRGC activities.
The move was widely criticized by senior Iranian officials, who claimed that the US law had violated the provisions of the JCPOA which were signed in July 2015 by Iran, the European Union and the P5+1 group of nations comprising the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom plus Germany. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had even warned that Tehran might pull out from the nuclear deal “within days or hours” if the United States continued its hostile policy, accusing Washington of being “neither a good partner nor a reliable negotiating party.” US officials have argued that sanctions were not related to the country’s nuclear program and therefore did not violate the deal.
Trump made the US relations with Iran even tenser by announcing on October 13 more sanctions against entities related to the ballistic missile program and the IRGC. Trump’s move prompted an immediate response from Tehran, with its Foreign Ministry warning that it would have “a consistent and harsh reaction” to the measures against the IRGC. Furthermore, the Iranian military vowed to speed up the development of the country’s missile program.
The next month the US Treasury Department expanded the sanctions against Tehran even further, imposing restrictions on the IRGS-related Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, Air Force, Al-Ghadir Missile Command, and Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization.
Even during his election campaign, Trump labeled the JCPOA as “the worst deal ever negotiated.” Since assuming the office in January, he had repeatedly slammed Iran for alleged non-compliance with the deal and threatened to pull out from the agreement which was actively promoted by his predecessor Barack Obama and led to the removal of all nuclear-related US sanctions against Tehran.
The Western diplomats and leaders exerted efforts to convince the Trump administration of the JCPOA’s merits on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. For example, the issue has been discussed at the bilateral meetings between Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Theresa May, however, they did not manage to make him change his stance. Trump told May that he had already made his mind on what he would do next month, when he was due to announce whether to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.
On September 19, Trump addressed the UN General Assembly on various international issues, including the nuclear deal with Iran and Tehran’s policy in the Middle East. The US president accused the Iranian authorities of funding terrorism, backing Syrian President Bashar Assad’s “dictatorship” and fueling the war in Yemen. Trump also stated that the nuclear deal served as a disguise for Iran’s nuclear program and called the deal itself an “embarrassment” to the United States.
Next day, the foreign ministers of all signatory states convened the meeting of the Joint Commission on the deal’s implementation. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained to his counterparts that the Obama administration implemented the deal through the executive order without congressional ratification, and therefore the United States was seeking to renegotiate the terms of the agreement so that it satisfied the incumbent president and the US citizens. He also confirmed that Trump had decided on whether to walk away from the deal, which prompted concerns about the US potential withdrawal.
On October 13, apart from announcing fresh sanctions, Trump stated that his administration had decided not to re-certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. He added that the White House would work with Congress and its allies abroad to fix “many serious flaws” of the agreement, in particular replacing temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program with permanent ones, and threatened to otherwise unilaterally terminate the deal. The US president citied Iran’s alleged non-compliance with the deal, referring to the fact that Iran had exceeded agreed-upon limits on its heavy water stocks several times.
If Washington pulls out of the agreement, it’s likely to not only re-impose its own nuclear-related sanctions on Iran’s economy, but might also demand the reinstatement of the UNSC’s sanctions, which were promoted by former US presidents George Bush and Barack Obama, and later lifted after the JCPOA was signed.
The United States sees sanctions and strengthening restrictions under the nuclear deal as coercive means to curb Iran’s aggressive policy in the Middle East, which contradict the US security interests. This includes Iran’s funding of the Shiite militia in crisis-torn Lebanon and Yemen, primarily through its ally, the Hezbollah movement, as well as support for the Assad government in Syria and engagement in the diplomatic row between Qatar and Arab states.
Furthermore, Washington is using economic and political pressure to roll back Iran’s non-nuclear military development, first and foremost, the country’s ballistic missile program which poses a direct threat to Iran’s adversaries and the US allies in the region, namely Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council, in particular Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) think tank, noted that despite division within the Congress on the nuclear deal, the US officials were sharing concerns with Tehran’s persistent attempts to arm Hezbollah in order to increase its military role in the region.
“Whatever the debate over the JCPOA, there may well be a broader consensus in the administration that Iran’s growing military role in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere in the region must be countered,” Abrams wrote in his blog post for CFR.
The harsh stance on Iran, though broadly criticized by other parties to the JCPOA, was welcomed by the United States’ major allies in the region, which have long been countering Iran’s attempt to gain stronger influence in the region. This, in turn, forged an unlikely alliance between the Israelis and the Saudis, who hold opposing positions on the Palestinian issue.
In November, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Gadi Eisenkot said in an interview with the Saudi Elaph newspaper that Israel was willing to share intelligence with Saudi Arabia regarding Iran’s activities in the region, with Iranian media even alleging that Israel is directly lobbying the US Congress to abandon the deal with Iran.
At the same time, the Trump administration may pursue certain goals in its domestic policy through exerting additional pressure on Iran.
Gianluca Pastori, an adjunct professor at Italy’s Catholic University of the Sacred Heart Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, told Sputnik that the sanctions policy aimed at proving to Congress that the Trump administration’s international stance was tougher than the approach of the previous administration.
“[Such moves] have a strong domestic dimension, appeasing the largely anti-Iranian Congress and remarking the difference existing between the current and the previous administration,” the expert said.
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